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The Oneness of the World and the Multiplicity
of Ethnic and/or National Traditions
I begin by pointing to a fundamental issue relevant to
research in Third World countries which is carried out
by people from the industrialised world. Today we
experience the mutual interdependence of peoples
from all parts of the globe, the oneness of the world; at
the same time each of the peoples is concerned to
preserve its uniqueness or, as it is called, its identity.
Indeed, 'spaceship earth' carries many nations.
However, all well known recent analyses - such as
C. F. von Weizsäcker's The Politics of Perils:
economics; society and the prevention of war (1978), the
two reports by the Brandt Commission (1980, 1983),
and the American Government Reports, Global 2000
(1980) and Global Future (1981) - deal with the
question of identity only in rather general, sometimes
contradictory terms.
They do not really examine the variety or the internal
heterogeneity of these cultures, that exist under the
veneer of technological civilisation. Apparently
considering survival strategies only a matter of
recommending measures to combat hunger, sickness,
and ignorance, and to stop the plundering of our
planet before it becomes irreparable, they make no
suggestions for the social and psychological internali-
sation of external political, economic, technological,
cultural, and - on a different basis - military effects
on the countries of the Third World.
Von Weizsäcker, an outstanding scholar in the fields
both of nuclear physics and philosophy, seeks to
promote the idea of an international domestic policy
- that is to say, a world policy developed through
international institutions, which would include
placing significant limitations on the sovereignty of
the great powers. He believes that with victory over
war itself, such a policy, while retaining a thoroughly
pluralistic international system, could lead to a world
order governed by reason.
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In this effort to show Pathways through Jeopardy, as
would be the exact translation of his 1976 collection of
essays, von Weizsäcker concentrates on the material
problems of human existence, the interrelatedness of
what he calls technological civilisation with economic
and political developments, as well as on the changes
in outlook indispensable to solving these problems. By
emphasising the possibility that world culture as
historically constituted is capable of further develop-
ment, he also points to a perspective which transcends
purely material interests, and indeed provides their
basis.
He criticises what he terms the 'technological
civilisation' which has 'today triumphed worldwide'
and which, as he sees it, is the 'logical consequence of
the central motive of modern Western culture'. He
writes: 'The automatism of technological civilisation
in its forward motion is the automatism caused by
training will and rationality of action at the expense of
reason. We accumulate means without a thought to
integrative ends' [1976:256]. Traditional bases of
culture seem to have lost their authority. Von
Weizsäcker speaks of the 'decay of our culture' evident
in unbridled egoism, in the pursuit of material
possessions, in ungovernability and similar
phenomena. He recognises at the same time that the
legitimacy of traditional values has been shaken to the
core. Thus, he is sympathetic with attempts,
particularly on the part of youth, to break out of
existing conditions.
Willi Brandt, in the introduction to his first report
[1980], points out that 'it is cultural identity that lends
men dignity', so that for him the preservation of
cultural identity and independence are crucial,
especially during the process of technological
modernisation. He warns against 'cultural
imperialism', while at the same time proposing a
catalogue of legal, social and economic principles, the
promulgation of which in the battle against hunger
and poverty would require a 'technologically based
world civilisation' and which would certainly lead to
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an unavoidable complication of adjustment processes,
if they were to be followed. Yet, Brandt states that 'it is
imperative to find a balance between the chances
offered by modern technology and the existence of
individual peoples and regions which do not want to,
and must not, lose their individuality. The solutions to
these problems cannot be uniform' [1980:35]. Brandt,
however, does not attempt to define the key phrase
'cultural identity', which by now has become virtually
a slogan. We will return to this point later.
The October 1980 report to the President of the United
States, Global 2000, represents a meaningful supple-
ment to the works of von Weizsäcker and the Brandt
Commission in pointing out the importance of global
interconnections and dangers. Willi Brandt speaks of
the 'globalisation of dangers and challenges', and
agrees with Weizsäcker that some manner of world
domestic policy must be developed [1976:27]. The
volume, Global Future, the successor to Global 2000,
leaves no doubt of tliis position. It argues for example
that it is not just a moral question for the United
States, but very much in its interest as well, to
contribute significantly more than it has yet
contributed towards the elimination of inequality
between rich and poor [1980:XIII f] - and, one must
unfortunately add, than it has under its current
president. We may speak of 'one world' today, but
certainly not in that optimistic naïvety peculiar to
some Americans who perhaps see themselves in the
role of global helmsmen. Nor are we speaking of some
'myth' which could be objected to by such political
critics as Ralf Dahrendorf [1980].
V. S. Naipaul's designation of India as a 'wounded
civilisation' [1977] - a phrase we will come back to
can also be applied generally to the weaknesses of
the present cultural situation. Von Weizsäcker puts his
hopes in a change of thinking which would require us
to 'transform our feelings of solidarity and justice into
reason' [1976:260]. He ventures thus far, while
expressly dispensing with any theory of culture. In his
survey of the world situation, he then offers a few
general statements which show clearly that here the
limits of analysis and conceptualisation have been
reached. On the one side, he foresees the possibility of
overcoming war 'on condition that historically
constituted human culture continues to develop and is
not destroyed' (p261). On the other side, we may well
ask what this human culture entails, for, as he says,
'the cultural assimilation of all parts of the world is
now underway . . . A world state [would however]
endanger freedom and promote cultural levelling'
(p263). Thus, even in Weizsäcker, a great deal remains
unresolved.
Scientific and technological civilisation does indeed
represent something like a world culture. It overlays
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the older, regional Third World cultures with its
language, its social norms, its rationalistic science, its
medicine, its capital and consumer goods production,
its global economy and worldwide communication. Its
means of production alter profoundly the conditions
of life in these cultures. Rich and poor, elite and
masses, town and country, all crystallise into
structures which partake of traditional social
structures in various modifications and to varying
degrees. Those who only see, or only wish to see, these
developments may speak optimistically of 'one world'
or of the rise of a 'world culture'. Yet the ties between
the old cultures of the Third World - their languages,
history, religious, values, and standards of living
and technological civilisation, with its cognitive,
instrumental rationality and its pragmatic, secular
values, are not formed without cost. To put it bluntly,
the surrender of traditional cultures in favour of
functional adaptation to a system of powerful
industrial states, does not proceed in the manner
perhaps imagined by some politicians and economists
who were nourished on the optimism of post-World
War II economic expansion and the euphoria
accompanying the achievement of political sovereignty
by former colonies.
In the countries of the Third World. innumerable
projects have been carried out on the initiative and
with the technical and financial help of international
institutions, governments of industrial states, private
monopolies, or by charitable organisations. Many of
these projects either failed or were only marginally
successful. Some of them have created mere branch
offices of a worldwide industrial and commercial
network which have been of little use to the local
population. As Dahrendorf rightly notes, the 'trickle-
down effect' from the elites into the population has
remained negligible. The more such projects were
intended to benefit the masses, the less they succeeded,
if they did not fail altogether - at the latest when the
'experts' returned home.
During the so called second development decade of
the l970s, the view gradually gained ground among
politicians and managers of development capital that
the main reason for the failure of development
projects had been, apart from political and economic
ones, that the task of mastering the cultural differences
between industrial and recipient nations had been
inadequately solved. The projects were undertaken
without adequate analysis of local and regional
traditions or natural, social and cultural needs;
without appropriate participation of the local
inhabitants; without attempting to familiarise project
managers with the given social situation; and without
adequate deliberation about the effects of the projects
or their long range future.
Thanks to such insights, if not only to them, special
attention has since been devoted to the satisfaction of
only the most urgent, so called basic needs of the Third
World. On this elementary level, it is argued, the
importance of the affected culture and thus the
problem of cultural differences would disappear. The
necessity of many practical measures notwithstanding,
the fact that many representatives of the Third World
see this set of priorities as, once again, disqualifying
their peoples along the lines of' modern technology for
the West and Gandhism for the Third World' [Nandy
1981:101], sheds doubt on the validity of the
assumptions that underlie them.
The Universal Responsibility of Reason
Here indeed the politicians, economic specialists, and
practitioners, including educationists, who deal with
the Third World have run up against a dilemma. It
must be asked whether the pragmatic steps they
recommend to achieve a modus vivendi really dojustice
to all nations' needs; and further, whether these steps
will assist in the breakthrough of a universal reason
capable of wresting the planet from the mercy of
economic, political and military interests governed by
particularist thinking. Studies in evolutionary theory,
along with the empirical research of cultural
anthropologists, sociologists and psychologists, take
on great significance in this connection. Though a
detailed account of their findings cannot be given here,
the following points may be made.
The cultural tradition which led to technological
civilisation in the 'First World'
The break in European culture which, as Weizsäcker
noted, came about as technological civilisation gained
predominance from the end of the eighteenth century,
is after all the consequence of that culture's particular
development since the Middle Ages, and these events
in turn were built upon Jewish, Hellenistic and
Christian traditions. We may therefore question
Weizsäcker's assumption that 'the intellectual and
material building blocks of technological civilisation
cannot be reproduced within decades by a culture
shaped by a different history, though this can be
achieved over a longer period of time' [1976:16].
Evidently, they are already being reproduced, but at
what cost and sacrifice? As Habermas has argued, the
'occidental world view' with its claim to universality
stands opposed to a 'mythic world view' in primordial
societies, which 'is hardly able to provide orientation
for rational action in our sense of the term' [1981:73].
For an emancipated [world] society of rational
communication to come into being, Habermas posited
the need for dispersing egocentrically conceived
visions of the world and rationalising our modes of
existence in the direction of free discourse between
cultures.
We can scarcely describe the 'modernisation' of many
Third World societies as having been 'rational' in
Habermas' sense. It is of note here that this author's
distinction between occidental and mythical world
views points to the radical difference between that
break in European cultural history cited by
Weizsäcker, since when Europeans have pursued, as
Max Weber put it, the 'demythification of the world',
and the collision of technological civilisation with the
differently formed cultures of the Third World, which
have been subjected to this civilisation with little
attempt to link it meaningfully with either their modes
of existence or their world view.
Multiplicity of Third World cultures and their
traditions
What Third World cultures do such policy makers as
Brandt and such philosophers as Weizsäcker have in
mind, when they state that 'cultural identity should be
maintained', or when they warn against the danger of
'cultural levelling'? The stereotyped opposition of the
First World (Europe) to the primordial world is an
artificial model useful mainly to clarify problems in
theory. Empirical studies only rarely come across
relatively small nests of surviving primordial cultures,
but a variety of cultures of the most highly
individuated nature - strikingly archaic cultures such
as those of certain Polynesian islands, or in isolated
regions of Black Africa, or among the Amazon
Indians of Brazil - exist alongside millenia-old high
cultures such as those of China and India.
The lands shaped by Islamic tradition exhibit many
tendencies, from fundamentalism to enlightened
cosmopolitanism. What do mode of existence and
world view mean in each of these different cultures,
and which orientation can be said to be rational? We
need to remind ourselves again and again that China,
India, and the Islamic countries have long and
significant traditions in natural science and technology.
As Rajni Kothari, Chairman of the Indian Council of
Social Science, wrote: 'What is common to all of them
is to think of science and technology as basically a
search for truth, as a means of self-realisation and
self-control, not as a means of bringing anything
under domination, including nature' [198 1:81].
Latin America is a continent of white colonisers,
Roman Catholic in origin, who largely destroyed the
ancient cultures they found there. Notwithstanding
their partial mixing with the Incas, Aztecs and other
Indian peoples, they remained the elite and thus still
stand more strongly in the European tradition than
peoples of the regions just mentioned.
All of the cultures mentioned - except for a very few
virgin areas - are already under the influence of
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technological civilisation. And the world view of this
civilisation is one in which 'science and technology are
but means for steamrolling almost the entire world
into a uniformity, reducing its rich diversity to a
predictable and predetermined state' [Kothari 1981].
Cities are becoming the focal points both of
'modernisation' and of impoverishment. Wherever
capital accumulates and industrialisation proceeds far
enough, 'threshold countries' emerge, technically
prepared to join the circle of industrialised countries
despite the poverty and underprivileged situation of
the masses of their people. Ifa country's leap onto the
capitalist train falls short, it is overtaken by famine
against which its subsistence economy is helpless.
Almost all of these national ethnic groups and cultures
exhibit historical discontinuities not unlike those of
European nations. As V. S. Naipaul wrote of India in
1977:
India in the late twentieth century still seems so
much itself, so rooted in its own civilisation, that it
takes time to understand that its independence has
meant more than the going away of the British; that
the India to which independence came was a land
of far older defeat; that the purely Indian past died
a long time ago [1977:8].
Naipaul is convinced that the people of India, after
centuries of foreign rule, while still united by their
traditions and world view - hierarchical, cruel,
impoverished - are nevertheless a 'wounded
civilisation'; and that particularly since the minimal
success of Gandhi's attempt to renew village cultural
life, India is a land without a vision of regeneration.
Can anything more positive be said about other
cultures? Have the cultures of Black Africa, thanks to
centuries of colonial rule, not also become 'wounded
civilisations' whose regeneration and accommodation
to western culture and technological civilisation seems
nowhere to be occurring, not even in Senghor's
négritude or Nyerere's ujamaa socialism? And, in the
countries of Central and South America, has there
really been an assimilation and accommodation
between the conquerors and the original inhabitants
like that envisaged in his murals by the great painter of
the Mexican Revolution. José Clemente Orozco?
If a transformation of the maxims of development
policy and the theories of social philosophy into
practical cooperative efforts between industrial and
developing countries is to come about at all, much
more intensive study and more empathetic under-
standing of these foreign cultures is necessary than
many who deal with them on a daily basis have shown,
even people who are active in the educational systems
or in research in the Third World countries.
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Cultural identity The statement that it is necessary to
maintain cultural identities is not really adequate to
describe the challenge which both industrial and
developing countries must face when dealing with one
another. 'Cultural identity' defines less a static
condition than a process, in the course of which a
society's mode of existence and value system develop
more or less consistently over a long period of time,
and not late in history in interaction with other
societies. The commitment to maintaining cultural
identities in Third World countries should not disguise
the reality that accommodation is necessary on both
sides, and that consequently the industrialised nations
will also have to submit to it.
1f the Third World is to be readied not only for an
assimilation of technological civilisation but also to
participate in the development of a modern
understanding of the world such as that conceived by
von Weizsäcker, in terms of universalistic reason, and
by Habermas, in terms of 'communicative reality',
then every egocentric - or ethnocentric - view of the
world will have to be dispensed with. This demand
would affect both more or less explicitly mythical
conceptions of the world, and the conception of
modern capitalist societies, distorted as it is by having
'devalued the substance of its traditions' (including,
we may add, its 'myths'!) and 'by its subordination to
the imperatives of a one-sided rationality limited to
cognitive and instrumental functions' - or, to put it
more precisely, a world view distorted by having
allowed the compulsions of a system to encroach on
daily life [Habermas 198 1:1 112, II 489 f1].
But is not all of this still mere theory? Is not the
damage to many old cultures far too advanced, and
has not the poverty of many peoples reached such a
level, that they scarcely can concern themselves now
with the dangers of technological civilisation, let alone
with questions of mutual accommodation in the sense
just described? Ashis Nandy of the Center for the
Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi, writes the
following about contemporary Third World societies:
Societies resist being taught; they prefer to learn on
their own. It is improbable that the western
experience will deter us from further mechanising
man and investing the machine with greater
charisma. The West's illnesses created by the
machine are too distant, its gains from technology,
measured in terms of power and wealth, too
obvious. Our suffering due to dependence and
poverty, on the other hand, seems real and
immediate, and the dangers posed by modern
technology in the Third World seem abstract and
hypothetical [1981:102].
To conclude this part of the discussion, we have
sought:
- to show the problems involved in the collision
between industrial and Third World cultures, and
their fundamental differences from upheavals in
European historical development;
- at least to suggest, contrary to widespread
simplifications, the extremely differentiated reality of
Third World cultures, which for the most part are
highly developed, if in many respects wounded by
events in their own history and by the impact of
technological civilisation;
- to disclose the misuse of the concept of 'cultural
identity' as an ideologically one-sided slogan, and to
indicate thereby the continuing importance and
responsibility of the industrial countries in their
communications with the Third World.
If the conditions which threaten the peace - and
indeed the very existence - of 'spaceship earth' are to
be overcome, if knowledge and power are to be
subordinated to reason, then the industrial states will
first have to question the assumptions on which their
own cultures, their science, their economies, and their
power politics are based, and moreover be willing to
submit to the analyses and critiques of Third World
nations. Furthermore, the industrial countries will
have to show that they can create the objective
conditions which make self-correction and com-
munication possible. Deserving special attention in
this regard is von Weizsäcker's pointed question, 'Are
we moving towards an ascetic world culture?' [1978a],
as well as Erhard Eppler's critique of the ostensibly
compulsive and irreversible nature of economic
growth and his ideas for Pathways out of Danger
[1981]. A demonstration of reasonable ways to deal
with knowledge, power, the world economy and
technology, may be the only chance we have to spare
the Third World from the pitfalls of industrial
civilisation Ashis Nandy has described.
The Significance of Different Cognitive Styles
By some short, very general remarks I should like to
point to the fact that differences between national
cultures in the Northern part of the world (Europe, the
US), as well as between regional and national cultures
in the South, lead to - what I would call - different
cognitive styles and different approaches in research.
Ifwe speak of research in Britain or in the Netherlands
we usually expect a rather inductive approach: it starts
from some kind of familiarity with the Anglophone or,
respectively, Dutch speaking Third World countries,
derived from colonial experience and continuing
communication. This provides the base for careful
collection and interpretation of data. lt results in
accurate, thoughtful descriptions based on evidence.
American researchers very often seem to be somewhat
more naïve. Why can the whole world not gain an
American view of the world? They usually stress the
collection of quantifiable data and the processing of
them by statistical methods: a style of research which
seems to be spreading all over the world at present, a
positivistic approach which is sometimes called a
'classic' paradigm. Many German researchers tend to
stress the need for more than merely middle range
theories; they work in a rather deductive way and, due
to German history since 1918, most of them lack
international experience compared with scholars and
research institutions from the previously mentioned
countries.
Before we come to cognitive styles in Third World
countries, let me add some further distinctions. Since
the end of the 1960s, it is generally recogised that
social, and particularly educational, research in
countries not our own needs intense empathy on the
part of the researcher for the foreign people he or she
will be dealing with. Their customs and further
cultural traditions, their social and economic
situation, provide important background information
and demand careful understanding and adaptation.
Usually, empathy will be correlated with the scientific
discipline to which the researcher belongs. Think of
the professional attitude of a cultural anthropologist
in comparison with the attitudes of an average
economist or even an engineer working at an
institution of higher education in the Third World.
National and disciplinary cognitive style will lead to
different sensitivity in the particular research task; and
the concept or notion of the latter may be linked more
or less strongly with the culture concerned or under
review. The stronger the sensitivity, the more difficult
become generalisations.
In turning to cognitive styles in Third World countries
I do not want to stress their cultural differences once
more but I should like to make two specific points:
- more or less all ofthese countries have undergone
and continue to undergo processes of modernisation
which in many respects are equal to 'westernisation'
according to their specific relations with individual
western countries. The British left their impact in
Anglophone, the French in Francophone, regions and
so did the Spanish, the Portuguese, the Dutch in their
former colonies. Even the US through its immense
economic power and very important role in modern
higher education and research is imprinting many
institutions and people with its own stamp;
- in all countries, westernisation is affecting the
urban elites far more than the common people.
Traditional social structures are overlaid with
antagonistic modern social classes. In these countries
social scientists usually come from traditional elites.
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They are socialised partly by their home culture, partly
by their education and training in one of the
'Northern' countries, be it the US, Britain, the
Netherlands, France or in far less frequent cases,
Germany. The more the scientists adapt to the
cognitive style of their reference country and strive for
acceptance as being equal to researchers there, the
more many of them lose contact with common people
in their own country and interest in their concerns.
With all respect for colleagues from these countries, I
sometimes gain the impression of a paradoxical
situation. There is a growing number of western social
scientists who try to understand indigenous cultures in
the Third World. They direct their attention to the
problems of the masses of people at the base of those
countries. At the same time scientists who grew up
there are tempted to devote their energy primarily to
research tasks and methods which would earn them
respect in the Northern part of the world, many of
them joining the stream of the braindrain.
The weights of influence mentioned in the first point
and the orientation remarked in the second can
mislead even conscientious researchers into misunder-
standing the cultures or minds of the educational
systems they are investigating. They need to be openly
taken into account, if educational research is to assist
cross-country understanding without promoting the
levelling of cultures.
The first two sections are adapted from: D. Goldschmidt, 1982,
'Raumschiff Erde - Nachdenken über Wege in der Gefahr'. in
K. M. Meyer-Abich (cd), Phrsik, Philosophie undPolitik: Festschrift
für C. F. y. Weizsäcker, Carl Hanser Verlag, Munich, PP 119-33.
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